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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SOCIETY OP SEPARATIONISTS, INC.
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; and,
RICHARD ANDREWS,

Case No, 91-0387

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
JAY B. TAGGART, Utah State
Superintendent of Public
Instruction,
Defendant/Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HON. TIMOTHY R. HANSON, JUDGE PRESIDING
(Trial Court Case No. CV-91-090-2848)

THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS,
INC., CHRIS ALLEN and RICHARD ANDREWS, by and through their
counsel of record, Brian M. Barnard and John Pace of the
Utah Legal Clinic, submit the following Brief in support of
Plaintiffs' appeal.

1

STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION
Appellants (the "Society") bring this appeal from a
decision by the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy
Hanson, judge presiding.

The Third Judicial District Court

granted appellee Jay Taggart's (the "Superintendent") motion
to dismiss.

Appellants seek reversal of that decision and

consideration on the merits.
This Court has jurisdiction in this appeal pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 4A of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) (1953 as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Issues
1.

Do plaintiffs; as taxpayers and parents of children

in the Utah public school system, have standing to challenge
the Superintendent's gift of ten thousand dollars
($10,000.00) of public funds to the Providence, Rhode Island
School District so that the School District could pursue its
legal battle to gain judicial approval of prayer at public
school graduation ceremonies?

2

2.

Do the significance of the constitutional issue

raised by the Superintendent's mis-appropriation, the
importance of establishing the propriety of the conduct of
public officials, and the need to provide future
constitutional guidance to Utah state officials establish
that judicial review of the Superintendent's mis-use of tax
funds is proper?
3.

Is the Society entitled to declaratory relief as to

the unconstitutionality of the Superintendent's gift of ten
thousand dollars ($10,000.00) to the Providence, Rhode
Island School District to aid its legal battle to gain
judicial approval of prayer at public school graduation
ceremonies?

II. Standard of Review
Because the trial court's rulings on all these issues
were strictly legal conclusions, this court need accord them
no deference and should apply a "correction of error"
standard of review.

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247

(Utah 1988).

3

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following constitutional provisions are
determinative in this action:
Article I, § 4, Utah Constitution:
• The right of conscience shall never be
infringed. . . . There shall be no union of
Church and State, nor shall any church dominate
the State or interfere with its functions. No
public money or property shall be appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or for the support of any
ecclesiastical establishment.
First Amendment, U.S. Constitution:
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . .
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case
This action arises under Article I, § 4 of the Utah
Constitution which prohibits the appropriation of public
funds in the aid of religious exercise or ecclesiastical
establishment.

Accordingly, the Society challenges the

Superintendents gift of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00)
of public funds to assist the Providence school district in
its legal crusade to gain court approval of government
sponsored prayers at junior high school graduation

4

ceremonies.

The Society seeks declaratory relief to

establish the illegality of this appropriation.
Relevant to this case is the practice of the Utah
Courts to grant taxpayers standing against state official to
contest the illegal use of public funds.

The Society's

claim triggers a related policy which permits the courts to
decide important constitutional issues which are technically
moot.

In certain circumstances, the courts recognize that

the strong public interest in judicial resolution of cases
involving the conduct of public officials overrides the
traditional requirement of case and controversy.

II.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
This is an appeal from a decision by the Honorable

Timothy Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County dismissing plaintiffs7 complaint,
(Exhibit "a11 attached; Trial Record at 2-8) , as set forth in
the court's Minute Entry of July 17, 1991, (Exhibit "b";
Trial Record at 33), and later embodied in an Order of
Dismissal signed August 6, 1991.
Trial Record at 37-38.

Exhibit "cM attached;

The notice of appeal was dated

August 16, 1991 and was timely filed.
Trial Record at 41-42.
5

Exhibit "d" attached;

Judge Hanson dismissed this action, contending that
plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action.

Despite

the importance of the constitutional questions posed by this
case, the district court declined to rule on the legality of
the contested behavior.

Appellants seek a ruling on the

Superintendent's gift to the Providence school district.

A

decision by this Court is particularly appropriate because
the case involves interpretation of Utah's stringent
Constitutional church state separation provision and because
it concerns public officials' duty bound to abide by that
constitution.

III. Statement of Facts
The Utah Chapter of the Society of Separationists,
Inc., comprised of citizens and taxpayers of Utah including
appellants Chris Allen and Richard Andrews, has as a
corporate goal, the preservation of the separation of church
and state as required by state and federal constitutional
law.

Complaint, 5 1.

Several members of the Society are

parents of children in Utah schools.
On January 23, 1991, the Superintendent gave the
Providence School Committee ten thousand dollars
($10,000.00) of Utah state educational funds to aid and
6

encourage the Providence School Committee to pursue a writ
of certiorari of Lee v. Weisman,
1014, (June 24, 1992).

U.S.

, Case No. 90-

Complaint, 5 7; Defendant's

Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary Disposition
("Superintendent's Summary Disposition Memo") at 2-3.

The

decision to contribute funds to the Rhode Island legal
campaign was made after the Superintendent consulted with
some parties to a pending Utah case challenging public
prayers at high school graduations, that is, the Attorney
General, the Governor and leaders of the Utah Legislature.
Superintendent's Summary Deposition Memo at 2-3.

At the

Superintendent's instructions, Rhode Island was to use these
funds to seek a reversal of the federal First Circuit Court
of Appeals' ruling that public prayer at Providence junior
high school graduation ceremonies violated the federal
establishment clause.
(D.R.I. 1990), affirmed

Id.; Weisman v. Lee, 728 F.Supp 68
908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990).

Although the gift from Utah was made while the Rhode Island
School Committee was seeking certiorari review, receiving
those funds clearly freed other Rhode Island school funds
which may have paid for the later brief on the merits in
support of school graduation prayer.

7

At the same time, other Utah public officials were
becoming involved in the Rhode Island school prayer case.
At the Superintendent's request, Utah's Attorney General
prepared and filed an amicus

brief also to support Rhode

Island's bid for certiorari.
Disposition Memo at 3.

Superintendent's Summary

After the United States Supreme

Court agreed to hear the Rhode Island school prayer case,
the Alpine School District in Utah County filed an

amicus

brief in Lee v. Weisman on the merits, vigorously advocating
prayer in public schools.

Society of Separationists, Inc.

et al vs. The Board of Education of Alpine School District,
pending in Fourth District Court in and for Utah County,
Case No. 91-040-0647.

Both the Utah Attorney General and

the Superintendent publicly announced that they, too, would
file an amicus
prayer case.

brief on the merits in the Rhode Island
Complaint 5 9.

In light of these extensive expenditures of Utah tax
funds to advance a pro-prayer stance before the United
States Supreme Court, the Society pursued its claim for
declaratory relief herein, seeking judicial consideration of
issues raised by the Superintendent's conduct.
19.

Complaint, 5

Appropriately, plaintiffs no longer seek injunctive

relief to prevent further appropriations to aid in the Rhode
8

Island case.

On June 24, 1992, the Supreme Court decided

Lee v. Weisman, reconfirming the viability of the Lemon
test, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) and holding
unconstitutional the practice of offering public prayers at
Rhode Island primary and secondary school graduation
ceremonies.

Lee v. Weisman,

U.S.

Supreme Court, (June 24, 1992).

, No. 90-1014, U.S.

Injunctive relief as

against Jay B. Taggart personally is also unnecessary since
he is no longer the Utah State Superintendent of Public
Instruction.

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
The reluctance of the Utah Courts to deny a plaintiff
access and an opportunity for a judicial resolution of
claims should compel this Court to allow the Society a
hearing on the merits of their case.

As taxpayers, citizens

and parents of children in Utah public schools, plaintiffs
and members of the Society have a right to challenge the
Superintendent's unlawful expenditure of public funds.
Indeed, Utah Courts have long granted taxpayers standing to
seek judicial declaration concerning the unlawful
expenditure of tax monies.

9

The Society's claim raises important issues of
constitutional interpretation and the propriety of the
conduct of public officials, and deserves judicial attention
despite any claim of being technically moot.

The extensive

financial involvement of Utah state officials in the Rhode
Island school prayer case, the unwillingness of these
officials to admit the inappropriateness of their actions,
and the likelihood that the challenged behavior will be
repeated underscore the need for judicial resolution and
instruction in this case.
Finally, the Superintendent's unlawful financing of the
Rhode Island appeal should be declared unconstitutional
under Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.

With

absolute and detailed language, the Utah establishment
clause specifically prohibits public funds or property from
being appropriated for religious exercise or ecclesiastical
establishment.

By spending Utah education funds in aid of

Rhode Island's pro-prayer stance before the United States
Supreme Court, the Superintendent appropriated public funds
for the support of religious exercise and establishment.

10

ARGUMENT
I. The Society has a Right to Seek Declaratory Relief as to
the Superintendent's Unconstitutional Expenditure of Public
Funds to Aid the Rhode Island Pro-Prayer Appeal.
This Court encourages access to and use of the
judicial system for the resolution of controversies.
Warning that dismissal of an action without a hearing on the
merits is a severe measure to be seldom used, the Court
insisted that "[w]hen a motion to dismiss is made, the trial
court should adhere to a policy of being reluctant to turn a
party out of court without a trial.11

Wells v. Walker Bank

and Trust Co., Inc., 590 P.2d 1261, 1263 (Utah 1979).
Because the present case raises significant constitutional
issues which need resolution, plaintiffs should have their
day in court.
Resolution of the controversy at bar is vital to the
interests of plaintiffs and the public.

In light of the

Utah's particularly stringent constitutional provisions
establishing the separation of church and state, the
defendant's conduct warrants review.

Unless the Society is

granted a hearing, parameters concerning the encouragement
of religious exercise by public officials sworn to uphold
the Utah Constitution will remain undelineated.

11

A. Plaintiffs Have Standing and Have Stated A Claim Upon
which Relief Can Be Granted, Sufficient to Initiate this
Action.
Utah law holds that the Society has standing to contest
the Superintendent's ten thousand dollar ($10,000.00)
contribution toward defense of Rhode Island's pro-prayer
stance.

Twice, in situations almost identical to the case

at bar, this Court has allowed taxpayers to challenge
unlawful expenditures of public funds.

1. Utah case law indicates that taxpayers have standing to
challenge unconstitutional appropriations of public funds.
Not constrained by the same constitutional case or
controversy requirements applied to federal courts, Utah
Courts have substantial discretion to confer standing "where
matters of great public interest and societal impact are
concerned."
1978).

Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah

While the principle of separation of powers demands

that the courts relinquish some issues to other branches of
state government, "it is the inherent role of the judiciary
to interpret constitutional provisions."
675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983) (citing

Jenkins v. Swan,

Matheson v. Ferry. 641

P.2d 674 (1982); Marburv v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
In Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451,
454 (Utah 1985), this Court recited the test to determine
12

standing (citing Jenkins v, Swan 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983))
(granting Salt Lake County standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a state tax statute).

The Court first

applies the traditional standing criteria which requires
that plaintiff be able to "show that he [or she] has
suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him
[or her] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal
dispute.11
(citing

Kennecott v. Salt Lake County, 702 P. 2d at 454

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1148).

Even if

traditional standing criteria does not apply, the plaintiff
has standing if "no one has a greater interest than he [or
she] and if the issue is unlikely to be raised at all it the
plaintiff is denied standing."

Id.

Finally, standing may

be granted "if the issues raised by the plaintiff are of
sufficient importance in and of themselves to grant him [or
her] standing."

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150.

Utilizing this analysis, this Court found taxpayers and
property owners had standing to sue the Salt Lake City
School District for declaratory relief:

"In the past, this

Court had granted taxpayers standing to challenge the
actions of political subdivisions for illegal expenditures
and to challenge the illegal use of public funds."

Olson v.

Salt Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 962 n.l (Utah
13

1986) (citing

Brummitt v. Qgden Waterworks Co,. 93 P. 828,

831 (Utah 1908); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1152-53 (other
citations omitted)).

Following ample precedent for

taxpayers standing, the Olson plaintiffs had standing
because "there [were] no more likely appellants and the
issue [was] otherwise unlikely to be raised*"
2d at 963 n.l.

Olson, 724 P.

Accordingly, individual taxpayers and the

Utah Taxpayers Association1 were allowed to challenge the
school district's creation of a second item reserve fund and
the use of the fund to cover unexpected contingencies.

Id.

Similarly, this Court allowed an individual taxpayer to
challenge the provision of public property and service to
religious organizations under Article I, § 4 of the Utah
Constitution.2

Jenkins v. Swan, supra,

675 P.2d at 1153.

1

The Olson Court readily granted the Utah Taxpayers
Association associational standing to sue on behalf of its
members under the test articulated in Utah Restaurant
Association v. Davis County, 709 P.2d 1159, 1162-63 (Utah
1985). Olson, 724 P.2d at 962-63 n.l.
2

While Jenkins was denied standing to contest service
of Utah educators in the Utah Legislature, this ruling was
made specifically because he was not a resident of the
school districts which allowed the challenged practice:
"Jenkins' interest is less direct than the interest of those
living in the relevant school districts or legislative
districts." Jenkins v. Swan, supra 675 P.2d at 1151.
Unlike Jenkins, the Society has unsurpassed interest in the
constitutional behavior of state education officials and
their expenditure of public educational funds.
14

The Court concluded that plaintiff Jenkins was able to bring
his action under the first step of the standing analysis
because he alleged direct and adverse injury for the
government's unlawful expenditures•

The Court further

maintained:
[W]e need not determine the extent of the adverse
impact on Jenkins; we only conclude that he has
alleged a direct adverse impact which may be
subject to proof, and it is likely that if the
governmental action is declared unconstitutional,
the adverse impact on Jenkins will be relieved.
Id. at 1153. Again, this Court held that taxpayers have
standing to raise constitutional claims concerning the
illegal expenditure of public funds.

2. Plaintiffs and members of the Society qualify under each
of the three steps of the standing analysis adopted by this
Court.
The Society has standing as taxpayers to challenge the
Superintendent's unconstitutional appropriation of public
funds.

Plaintiffs and members of the Society are

appropriate parties to bring this action under each step of
the standing analysis.

Like Jenkins, the Society is

directly and adversely impacted by the Superintendent's
unlawful expenditures.

As parents of students in the public

schools and as tax paying citizens concerned with the
education of Utah's youth, plaintiffs have a stake in
15

preventing the expenditure of tax money in a manner that
violates "specific constitutional protections against . . .
abuses of legislative power,"

Flast v. Cohen. 392 U.S. 83,

106 (1968) (taxpayers had standing to seek declaratory
relief where they alleged that federal officials were using
public funds to finance instruction in and to purchase
educational materials for religious and sectarian schools).3
As taxpayers, plaintiffs will be required to "replenish the
public treasury for the deficiency . . . caused by the
misappropriation."
(quoting

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1153

Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 434 at 443, 228 P.2d 818

at 823 (1951).

In addition, when the Superintendent's

actions are declared unconstitutional, the adverse impact
upon the Society will be alleviated, Jenkins v. Swan, 675
P.2d at 1153, demonstrating that there is a "causal
relationship alleged between the injury to the plaintiff[s],
the governmental actions and the relief requested."

Id. at

1150.

Despite the more stringent standing requirements
applied in federal court and the reluctance of federal
courts to grant standing to taxpayers, the Supreme Court
allowed (and asserted jurisdiction over) this taxpayer suit
to contest violations of the Establishment Clause by
education officials. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
3
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In addition to the Society having standing under the
first step, the Society has standing because no other party
has a greater interest in the school board's allocation of
public funds than the taxpayers and parents who are assessed
those funds.

Kennecott v. Salt Lake County, supra,

702 P.2d

at 454. These individuals have a profound interest in
seeing that school board funds are spent for appropriate
educational purposes and that their children are not denied
the benefits because of improper allocation of funds.
Additionally, if plaintiffs were denied standing, the issues
raised in this case will likely go unresolved.

If taxpayers

and parents are not allowed to contest the spending
practices of the school board, these education officials
will "be effectively insulated from challenges."

Kennecott

v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d at 455.
Finally, the concerns raised by this case are of
sufficient public importance —

in and of themselves —

grant the Society standing to pursue its claims.

to

In dispute

is the unconstitutionality of the conduct of a public
official sworn to uphold Utah's constitution.

Central to

this case is interpretation of Utah's strict establishment
clause which prohibits absolutely the expenditure of public
funds to advance religious exercise.
17

The public is entitled

to have the Superintendent's actions judicially reviewed
given the profound interest in seeing that their officials
follow the state constitution.
On the basis of the standing requirements adopted by
this Court and the cases in which the Court has allowed
taxpayer suits, the Society has standing to bring this
action.

Importantly, plaintiffs and citizens of Utah alike

have been denied their right not to have tax dollars spent
in endorsement of religious practices and access to the
Courts is the most appropriate avenue for relief for this
injury.

a. This Case Is Not Moot and Requires Judicial Review and
Intervention.
Although there is a judicial policy against the
adjudication of moot questions, circumstances may afford
exceptions to this prohibition.

See Merhish v. H.A. Folsom

& Associates, 646 P.2d 731 (Utah 1982).4

4

This Court has

In Merhish, this Court ruled that when the only
specific relief sought - a wage payment - was awarded in
full, the respondent's motion concerning a lien and a
garnishment was moot. The Court insisted that the employee
had been granted his wage payments and further requests for
judicial relief would not affect the rights of the
litigants.
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established criteria for determining which cases warrant
judicial scrutiny despite their apparent mootness:
The principles that determine the justiciability
of the instant case are the well-established rules
which permit a court to litigate an issue which,
although technically moot . . . is of wide
concern, affects the public interest, is likely to
recur in a similar manner, and . . . would
otherwise likely escape judicial review.
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981) (citations
omitted); See also

Kelp v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah

1987) ; Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911) (establishing the rule
that "moot" situations "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" may still be litigated).

The case before this Court

presents valid and important issues of constitutional
interpretation and the appropriateness of official conduct
which deserve judicial attention.

b. Exceptions to the mootness doctrine include important
issues of wide concern/ apt to be repeated and which affect
the public interest.
Where constitutional issues are in dispute, the public
interest is served by settling the legality of questionable
practice.

Wickham, 629 P.2d at 899. While the discretion

to address a moot issue rests with the court, the decision
to hear a moot case is most often made in "class actions,
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questions of constitutional interpretation, issues as to the
validity or construction of a statute, or the propriety of
administrative rulings."

Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d

1044 (Utah 1990) (quoting

McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190,

1191 (Utah 1974))*

Additionally, exceptions to the mootness

doctrine are justified when "there seldom will be sufficient
time for an appellate court to intervene before" the
challenged conduct is concluded.

Society of Professional

Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah 1987).
Other state and federal courts have applied this
analysis to enable adjudication of constitutional issues of
particular public import.

For example, in Mowrer v. Rusk,

618 P.2d 886 (N.M. 1980), the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled
that although subsequent legislation resolved the issues
presented in the case before the bench, the important
constitutional concern of separation of powers warranted
judicial determination.

Thus, two municipal court judges

were permitted to bring a declaratory judgment action
against several Albuquerque City officials.

The New Mexico

Supreme Court maintained that because the case provided an
opportunity for a ruling on the conduct of public officials,
it should not be dismissed because of mootness:

"Among the

criteria considered in determining the existence of the
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requisite degree of public interest are the public or
private nature of the question presented, the desirability
of an authoritative determination for future guidance of
public officers, and the likelihood of future recurrence of
the question-"

Mowrer, supra, 618 P.2d at 889,

(citing

People v- Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 772 (111. 1952),
denied,

344 U.S. 824 (1952)).

cert,

The Court also held that the

constitutional issues raised by Mowrer were worthy of
judicial review because "[t]he parameters of the separation
of powers doctrine presents a recurring problem of great
public interest."

Mowrer, 618 P.2d at 890.

Similarly, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that although the school district indicated that prayers in
band class had ceased, the case presented an actual
controversy.

Steele v. Van Buren Public School District,

845 F.2d 1492 (8th Cir. 1988).

"Voluntary cessation of

allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of
power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make
the case moot."

Id. at 1494 (quoting

United States v. W.T.

Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953) (where "the heavy
burden of demonstrating that Athere is no reasonable
expectation that the wrong will be repeated7 was placed on
the defendant.")

Because the Van Buren school district
21

failed to show "that it does not and will not permit prayer
at school functions," Steele was not moot.
at 1494-95.

Steelef 845 P.2d

The challenge to the school district action

remained valid because the defendant was free to resume the
disputed conduct and had not met its heavy burden of
"showing that *there is no reasonable expectation' that it
will permit teachers to conduct prayer in school. . . . "
Id. at 1494-95.

c. Because this case presents a critical question of
constitutional interpretation and governmental conduct which
impact the public concern, it deserves the attention of this
Court.
As the foregoing cases establish, the current matter
presents constitutional issues which demand clarification by
this Court.

The actions of the Superintendent —

his

allocation of public funds to encourage and support prayer
at graduation ceremonies —
to the public.

raise questions of wide concern

Wickham, supra,

629 P.2d at 899.

In

particular, the detailed language of the Utah establishment
clause imposes a heightened duty on state actors to maintain
rigid separation of church and state.
I, § 4.

Utah Const. Article

Few things warrant the attention of this Court or

threaten the public interest more than state officials who
violate a highly prized provision of the state constitution.
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McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d at 1191; Reynolds, supra.

In

addition, the speed with which public officials can disburse
public funds under their discretion will rarely permit
adequate opportunity for judicial intervention before an
appropriation has been made and the funds spent.

Bullock,

743 P.2d at 1169. Resolution of this case will provide
Utah's public officials with important judicial guidance so
that they can conform their future conduct to the dictates
of the Utah Constitution.

As in Mowrer, a ruling on the

constitutionality of the Superintendent's conduct will guide
future actions of all public officials entrusted with
discretion over the public coffers.
Most importantly, the actions implicated in this case
are likely to re-occur.

Absent direction from this Court

and while interpretation of the Utah establishment clause
remains disputed, public school officials and other state
actors may well spend more public money to support future
legal battles which endorse religious exercise.

While the

issue of public prayer at graduation ceremonies may be
temporarily resolved, the recent decision in the United
States Supreme Court was 5 to 4.
90-1014.

Lee v. Weisman, supra,

No.

A change in United States Supreme Court make up or

a slight alteration in the reasoning endorsed by members of
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the majority may rekindle enthusiasm for litigation aimed
again at permitting prayer at public school functions.

In

addition, the United States Supreme Court specifically did
not decide the issue of prayers at ceremonies at state
colleges or universities.

Id. at 14 (opinion).

Perhaps the

next case in which Utah officials will become involved will
seek judicial approval of public prayers at university
graduations or football games.

The range of possible

violations of Article I, § 4 by Utah officials is not
limited to the context of religious exercise in public high
schools.

As the Lee v. Weisman Court insisted,

lf

[t]his case

does not require us to revisit the difficult questions
dividing us in recent cases, questions of the definition and
full scope of the principles governing the extent of
permitted accommodation by the State for the religious
beliefs and practices of many of its citizens.11

Id. at 7.

Without guidance from this Court, Utah officials could and
may engage in all manner of legal campaigns to place the
state7s imprimatur upon religious activity.

Society of

Separationists, et al vs. Whitehead, et al. Case No. 91090613 6, (Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
April 9, 1992) pending before this Court on appeal, Case No.
92-0233.
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Indeed, the principle of Steele that unilateral
cessation of challenged behavior does not lessen the need
for judicial intervention further supports the Society's
request for declaratory relief herein.

The Superintendent

insists that he did not violate the state constitution by
spending public funds in support of a pro-prayer legal
stance.

Superintendent's Memorandum in Support of his

Motion to Dismiss at 10-11.

Although the Superintendent

recanted on his public pledge to further involve Utah public
funds in the Rhode Island case, his promise to do so also
indicates that he found nothing unsettling about his past
behavior and that he apparently would not hesitate to engage
in similar behavior in the future.

Clearly, under W.T.

Grant, the Superintendent has not met the burden of
demonstrating that state officials will not repeat the
contested conduct.

Appellee or his successors remain free

to (and apparently prone to) engage in similar behavior
unless there is a mandate from this Court.5
5

Guidance to governmental officials is especially
necessary and important to the constitutional issues raised
by this case; several state officers saw fit to spend public
funds to support the Providence school district in its proprayer appeal. As indicated above, supra at 8, the Attorney
General of Utah filed an amicus brief in support of
Providence's petition for certiorari and the Alpine School
District filed an amicus brief on the merits in Lee v.
Weisman, vigorously advocating prayer at public school
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Clear precedent and solid legal theory establish the
Society's request for declaratory relief worthy of judicial
attention.

The Superintendent's conduct is capable of

repetition, but evasive of review.

Given the continued

attempts of the United State Supreme Court to delineate the
wall that separates church and state, there will be many
opportunities for Utah government officials to contribute
public funds to litigants supporting government religious
exercise in future legal battles.

The speed with which

public appropriations can be made frustrates prevention of
unlawful expenditures before they occur.

In light of the

Superintendent's failure to even suggest that similar
appropriations will not be made in the future, the Society
is entitled to a ruling on the constitutionality of the
challenged expenditure.

Indeed, courts are particularly

compelled to make judgments when constitutional questions
and the lawfulness of conduct of public officials is at
issue.

Most importantly, a ruling on the merits of this

case will properly serve the important public interest of
delineating the separation of church and state demanded by
Utah's establishment clause.

functions.
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II. The Society is Entitled to Declaratory Judgment
Establishing as Unconstitutional the Superintendent's
Contribution of Public Funds to the Pro-Prayer Appeal.
While this Court has had little opportunity to construe
the establishment clause of the Utah Constitution, the
provision invites only rigid interpretation.

Article I, § 4

of the Utah Constitution reads quite differently than the
federal establishment clause.6

In part, the Utah provision

directs:
. There shall be no union of Church and
State, nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions. No public money or
property shall be appropriated for or applied to
any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or
for the support of any ecclesiastical
establishment. . . .
Unlike its federal counterpart, the Utah Constitution
provides a strict and specific guarantee of separation of
church and state.

See Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674, 689

(Utah 1982) (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting, four
separate opinions, utilizing constitutional construction
which looked to the precise wording of the provision for the
framers' intent).

Appropriately, the unique language of the

6

The establishment clause of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution reads simply: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
ii
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establishment clause of the state constitution has not gone
unnoticed by this Court:
. [P]rovision of Section 4, Article I, of
the Utah Constitution . * . is more articulate and
express in assuring religious liberty and
prohibiting discrimination, or church interference
with private or public rights, than the generality
of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549, 552-553 (Utah 1973)
(Crockett, J., concurring).

While this Court has not

articulated any detailed analysis or constitutional standard
premised upon the guarantees of this provision, the cases
that interpret Article I, § 4 indicate that any direct or
non-incidental aid to religious exercise is prohibited by
the provision.7
7

While this Court has not had the opportunity to deal
at length with the terms of Article 1, § 4 of the Utah
Constitution, the Court has developed a body of state law
based on other unique provisions of the state constitution.
For example, in KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513 (Utah
1983), the Court undertook the interpretation of Article 1,
§ 15 of the Utah Constitution even though the issue before
then could have been concluded under federal law. (Article
1, § 15 provides, similar to the language of the First
Amendment: "No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain
the freedom of speech or of the press.") Conceding that the
provision had never been authoritatively interpreted, the
Court took on the task, beginning with a survey of
discussion concerning the provision at the Constitutional
Convention. id. at 518-519. Because the intent of the
authors' was not forthcoming from delegative history, the
Court turned for guidance to the judicial decisions —
especially those prior to the 1895 Convention — in states
with constitution provisions similar to those of Utah. id.
After lengthy analysis of these cases, the Court concluded
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A. Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution Prohibits Direct
Aid to Religious Exercise.
Twice in 1948, this Court dealt with challenges to
government action under the state's no-aid provision.

In

Gubler v. Utah State Teachers7 Retirement, 113 Utah 118, 192
P. 2d 580 (1948), the Court upheld a retirement plan which
allowed teachers to receive retirement credit for years
spent teaching in private schools.

Because this program

served to entice experienced teachers away from private
schools and gave them retirement credit only after they had
joined the public school system, the Court held that the
scheme did not involve the appropriation of public funds for
religious instruction.

Id. at 192, P.2d at 587. On similar

grounds, this Court also refused to enjoin the use of state
funds for the construction of a memorial building by the
Daughters of Utah Pioneers.

Thomas v. Daughters of Utah

Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477 (1948).

The Court held

that without "positive evidence of the efforts on the part
of [the] society to favor any particular religion," it would
assume that the ultimate nature of the project would be
that although freedom of the press was not intended to be
absolute or superior to other constitutional guarantees, the
delegates and voters who framed and adopted Article 1, § 15
intended the provision to be "at least as protective of
[freedom of the press] as the First Amendment." Id. at 521.
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secular.

Id. at 197 P.2d at 489 (emphasis original).

Therefore, funds appropriated to aid the memorial building
did not violate the ban on public aid for religious
purposes.

More recently, this Court sustained a plan to

sell municipal bonds to finance the construction of a
hospital by a church run corporation and to lease state land
for the project.
(1973).

Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549

However, the scheme was found to be constitutional

because terms of the lease explicitly prevented religious
activities in the hospital.8
In each of these cases, this Court found that no
religious practice or institution stood to benefit from the
challenged government action and saw no reason to
investigate further the implications of Article I, § 4.
The challenged schemes did little or nothing to advance
religion institutions involved.

Importantly, the primary

purpose of each scheme was secular and outweighed any
insubstantial gains realized by the religious or quasireligious organizations.
8

The lease provided "that there will be no chapels or
other religious rooms set aside at the hospital and there
will be no religious symbols . . . [and] no proselyting by
any religious sect or distribution of literature, books
brochures, symbols, or other activities relating to or being
of a proselyting nature shall be in said hospital." Manning
517 P.2d at 551.
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Although final parameters of Utah establishment law are
not clear, a strict interpretation foundation for the
provision is in place•

This basis can be further augmented

by analysis of strict separation rulings in states with noaid declarations similar to Utah's provision.

B. In States With Constitutional Provisions Similar to
Utah's, Courts Have Rigidly Interpreted No-Aid Provisions.
History indicates that Utah adopted its establishment
provision from the Washington State Constitution and indeed,
the similarities between the two provisions suggest this.
Hickman, Utah Constitutional
University of Utah (1955).

Law, Doctoral Thesis,
Article I, § 11 of the

Washington Constitution9 mandates that

fl

[n]o public money or

property shall be appropriated for, or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support
of any religious establishment."

In equally strong

language, Article IX, § 4 of the Washington Constitution
guarantees that public schools will be free of sectarian

9

Wash. Const. Art. I, § 11 has been amended twice, in
1904 to allow for employment of chaplains at state prisons,
and in 1957 to allow for chaplains at custodial and mental
institutions.
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control or influence.10

On the basis of these two passages,

the Washington Supreme Court has maintained a strict
approach to separation of church and state in public
schools.

The Washington Court has repeatedly found the

absolute language of its state charter to demand analysis
more rigid conduct than federal precedent.
Weiss v. Bruno, 509 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1973), challenged a
state tuition scheme to benefit disadvantaged students
attending private schools and private institutions of higher
learning.

To invalidate this program, the Washington Court

found the proscription of Article IX, § 4 determinative.
Contending that the provision was "far stricter than the
more generalized prohibition of the first amendment,"

the

Court announced that:
There is no such thing as a ^de minimis' violation
of article IX, § 4. Nor is a violation of this
provision determined by means of a balancing
10

Wash. Const. Art. IX, § 4 reads: "All schools
maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public
funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or
influence." Although Utah has a similar provision, the
prohibition of sectarian influence in public schools is not
directly relevant to the issue of prayer. However, most
state establishment case law involves aid to parochial
schools and therefore refers to mandates concerning public
schools as well as the prohibitions of the establishment
clause. While the decisions in these cases rely upon the
language in both the general and public school provisions,
the holdings often deal separately with the more broad text
of the establishment clause.
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process. The words of article IX, § 4 mean
precisely what they say; the prohibition is
absolute.11
Far from unusual, the Weiss decision followed a line of
precedent containing a literal reading of the absolute terms
of the state Constitution.

Previously, the Washington Court

had twice held that publicly funded transportation of
parochial school students violated both Article I, § 11 and
Article IX, § 4.12

Further, the Court specifically rejected

the argument that it should permit public transportation of
private school children because such a program had been
sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court.

Consistent

with its rejection of direct or indirect aid to religious
schools, the Court also struck down state-sponsored loan
programs for church college students.

State Higher

Education Assistance Authority v. Graham, 529 P.2d 1051
(Wash. 1974).
Witters v. State Commission of the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119
(Wash. 1989), represents the Washington Court's most recent

11

Id. at 978. A footnote to this passage suggests that
the only possible qualification to the "sweeping
prohibition" of this state constitutional provision would be
the free exercise clause of the United States Constitution.
12

Mitchell v. Consolidated School District No. 201, 135
P.2d 79 (Wash. 1943), and Visser v. Nooksack Valley School
District No. 506, 207 P.2d 198 (Wash. 1949).
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refusal to back down from its rigid interpretation of the
state's constitutional guarantees.

After the United States

Supreme Court found valid state assistance to a visually
handicapped student seeking a theological education under
the First Amendment, the Washington Court accepted the high
court's offer "to consider the applicability of the xfar
stricter' dictates of the Washington State Constitution."
Id. at 489.

Under the mandate of Article I, § 11, no

appropriations could be made for the applicant's education
without violating the prohibition against public funds for
religious instruction.

Id. at 1119-1120.

Finally, the

state Court rejected arguments that the denial of aid
threatened the applicant's free exercise rights or
implicated equal protection.

Id. at 1122-1124.13

In Sands v. Morongo Unified School District, 809 P.2d
809 (Cal. 1991), the California Supreme Court found that the
practice of including prayers at high school graduation

13

The Washington Court found that the applicant had
failed to show fl>the coercive effect of the enactment as it
operates against him in the practice of his religion.'"
(quoting District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)).
Admitting that the applicant may find it difficult or
impossible to seek a theological education without state
aid, the Court insisted that free exercise does not entail
that the government financially facilitate the pursuit of
religious exercise. Id. at 1123.
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ceremonies violated the state constitution.14

Because

Article XVI, § 5 of the California charter "prohibits not
only material aid to religion but any official involvement
that promotes religion," government endorsement of
graduation prayers was deemed unconstitutional.
P.2d at 820 (emphasis original).

Sands, 809

Additionally, the "no

preference" clause of Article I, § 4 —

more protective of

separation than the analogous federal provision —

was

readily violated when the government appeared to take
"positions on religious questions" by including prayer at
graduations.

Id.

Rejecting the incidental benefit theory used by the
court below, the California Supreme Court in another case
concluded that a textbook loan program to students of
private schools was unconstitutional.

California Teachers

Association v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981).
14

The Riles

Article I, § 4 of the California Constitution
guarantees the "[f]ree exercise and enjoyment of religion
without discrimination or preference, . . . " while Article
XVI, § 5 provides: "Neither the Legislature, nor any
county, city and county, township, school district, or other
municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or
pay from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or
in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian
purpose whatever. . . . " and Article IX, § 8 states: "No
public money shall ever be appropriated for the support of
any sectarian or denominational school, and any school not
under the exclusive control of the officers of the public
schools."
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Court adopted a two-part test to determine if government aid
violated the California Constitution, asking first if the
benefit derived from the loan program was direct or indirect
and second, if the aid was substantial or incidental.

Id,

at 962 (confirmed in Sands, 809 P.2d 809 (Mosk, J.
concurring)).

Applying the first prong of this test, the

Court concluded that because providing textbooks to children
supports both the students and the school, the program
impermissible benefits the sectarian school.
963.

Id. at 962-

Under the second prong, the Court found that text

books, unlike fire protection, advanced the central
objective of the sectarian schools —
Id. at 963.

education of children.

The Court avidly rejected the assumption that

secular texts would be used for secular instruction only.
Id. at 963-964.
Oregon has similarly declared graduation prayers
unconstitutional on the basis of a no-aid provision15 of the
state constitution.

Kay v. David Douglas School District

No. 40, 719 P.2d 875 (Or.App. 1986), rev'd

15

and dismissed

Article I, § 5 of the Oregon Constitution states:
"No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the
benefit of any religeous [sic] or theological
institution, nor shall any money be appropriated for
the payment of any religeous [sic] services in either
house of the Legislative Assembly.11
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for

lack

of justiciability,

738 P.2d 1389 (Or. 1987).

In Kay

the Oregon Court interpreted the prohibition of Article I, §
5 strictly, finding it applicable even though the teacher
scheduled to lead the prayer volunteered her time:
The fact that money spent on the preparation and
delivery of the invocation was not apportioned and
identified as a "line item" in the budget does not
take it out of the proscription of section 5,
which prohibits the spending of any money for the
benefit of any religious or theological
institution.
Id. at 878 (emphasis original).

The Oregon court declared

that the "wall of separation between church and state" was
breached.

Id.

When taken as a whole, the court held that

Article I, § 5 forbids "far more" than just direct payments
in support of a religious institution.

Id. at 878.

While the above pited cases portray the inclination of
state courts to interpret state constitutional provisions
independently of federal law and to uphold the strict
separation of government and religion mandated in these
provisions.

The diligence with which these courts guard

against state establishment of religion should influence
this Court to embrace a rigid interpretation of Article I, §
4.

Interestingly, the reasoning adopted by the California

Courts to interpret their state constitutional provisions is
similar to interpretation suggested by Utah case law.
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While

both constitutions may allow incidental benefits to
religious institutions and practice, aid that directly
benefits religion or aid with a central purpose to benefit
religion is prohibited.

Unlike the California textbook loan

program that benefitted children and non-secular schools
directly, the Utah schemes were not intended to and did
little to advance the religion.

Thomas v. Daughters of Utah

Pioneers, 197 P.2d 477; Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d
549.

Although the California Courts would not permit a

textbook loan program, they approve governmental fire
protection and waste removal for religious institutions.
These benefits are incidental and part of broad programs not
directed at religious institutions themselves.

Similarly,

the Utah Constitution allowed some indirect benefits to a
church that built a hospital or a historical society that
constructed a museum when this Court was assured that each
edifice was devoid of religious overtones.

Any benefits to

the religious institutions were permissible because they
were ancillary and incidental.

However, like the California

Constitution, the Utah Constitution does not permit the
expenditure of public funds which are intended to and
directly do aid and support religious exercise.
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C. The Superintendent's Ten Thousand Dollar ($10,000.00)
Appropriation Constitutes An Unlawful Expenditure of Public
Funds on Religious Exercise.
By financing Rhode Island's appeal of the First Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision to ban public prayer at school
graduation ceremonies, the Superintendent was directly
encouraging and aiding a religious exercise —
public schools.

prayer in

The only other action that the

Superintendent could have taken which would have more
directly aided or encouraged prayer at Rhode Island Schools
would have been to direct that Utah's $10,000.00 (Ten
Thousand Dollars) be used to pay an honorarium to the
preacher recruited to give the invocation.
The unconstitutionality of this expenditure is readily
distinguishable from the legitimate need for the
Superintendent to finance litigation in which he or the
state public school system is a party.

While the

Superintendent's ten thousand dollar ($10,000.00) gift
constitutes direct and purposeful aid to and support of
religious exercise, any funds spent for litigation involving
prayer to which the state of Utah is a party, would only
incidentally benefit religious exercise.16

16

Using the

Plaintiffs are not challenging the expenditure of
state funds to defend this action.
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analysis implied in Utah case law and articulated in
California establishment law, the impropriety of the former
expenditure in contrast to the legitimacy of the latter
appropriation is apparent.
As legal advisor to the Superintendent, the Utah
Attorney General can "prosecute or defend all causes to
which the state . . . is a party; and take charge, as
attorney, of all civil legal matters in which the state is
interested. . . ." U.C.A. § 67-5-1 (1953 as amended).17
There is no provision which allows the Superintendent to
finance any legal battle he chooses, especially when doing
so violates the constitution.

However, should the

Superintendent be a party to a law suit that, for example,
contests the constitutionality of public prayer at Utah
public schools graduations, public funds can lawfully be
spent to defend the Superintendent in court.
To defend the exercise of discretionary power by state
officials is a secular activity.

If such litigation

involved prayer, any resulting expenditure of public funds

17

Interestingly, the role of the Attorney General in
law suits to which the state is not a party is limited to
that of serving as an attorney. There is no authority for
the contention that the Superintendent or the Attorney
General can choose to finance — rather than participate in
— any litigation they choose.
40

would only incidentally promote religious exercise.

The

primary purpose of the funds would be to fulfill the state's
obligation to defend employees in litigation brought on by
actions taken in their official capacity.
§ 63-3 0-3 6 (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann.

The defense of state

officials is not intended to promote religious exercise,
thus, if it does so, it does only incidentally.

Defense of

such litigation would not constitute voluntary or purposeful
support of religious exercise.
For similar reasons, the Utah Constitution is not
violated when the state or cities provide fire protection
and waste removal to religious institutions.

The government

has a broad policy of providing fire protection and waste
removal that is not aimed at religious institutions in
particular.

When such a program incidentally aids a

religious institution, the benefits are not the consequence
of direct aid to non-secular activity.

Any such incidental

benefits to religious institutions are overridden by the
non-secular purpose of the policy.
However, such situations which involve only incidental
benefits to religious exercise are radically different from
the case at bar, where the Superintendent has voluntarily,
affirmatively and purposefully aided the litigation, the
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sole purpose of which is to legalize prayer at public school
graduation ceremonies.

The Superintendent has intentionally

chosen an issue and he has voluntarily decided to promote
one side of the issue.

He did not involuntarily become

embroiled in the Rhode Island case and his promotion of
religious worship is not an incidental result of his
official duties.

Instead, his support of the Rhode Island

case constitutes a deliberate choice to finance the proprayer stance advocated by the Providence school district.

The Superintendent can offer no legitimate secular
reason for the gift to the Providence school district and no
potential secular effect which could result from the
Superintendent's pro-prayer appropriation.

Rather than

reflecting a neutral stance, the Superintendent's choice to
fund only one side of the Rhode Island prayer case, advanced
solely the cause of prayer in public schools.

Certainly,

if, as he now claims, the Superintendent had wanted to
insure that the issues reached the United States Supreme
Court for "resolution,11 the equitable approach would be to
equally fund both sides of the dispute.

Yet, the

Superintendent did not contribute to the legal fees of
Weisman, the prayer opponent in the Rhode Island case, to
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guarantee that the anti-prayer arguments were adequately
presented to the high court.

Instead, he funded only the

efforts of those who supported prayer in public schools.
Additionally, the Superintendent now justifies his
actions in part claiming he sought the end of litigation in
Utah's courts concerning prayer at school.

In fact, a

decision by the United States Supreme Court to deny
certiorari would have achieved this goal.

Such a denial

would have approved the First Circuit's ruling that prayer
in public high school graduation ceremonies violates the
establishment clause.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals'

decision in Weisman v. Lee was consistent with the rulings
of other federal Courts of Appeal that prayer at public
school events violates the federal establishment clause.
See Collins vs. Chandler Unified School District, 862 F.2d
824 (11th Circuit); Edwards vs. Acruillard, 482 U.S. 578
(1987).18

Because the First Circuit's ruling is consistent

18

Opponents of the Lee v. Weisman ruling allege that
the conflicts existed among recent rulings in the Courts of
Appeals. The Sixth Circuit, in Stein v. Plainwell Community
Schools, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987), applied a test from
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (where nonsectarian
prayers opening state legislative sessions were upheld
because of the traditional nature of the practice), to
reject the use of the nonsecular prayers during graduation
ceremonies. The First Circuit in Weisman v. Leer 728 F.
Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990)
rejected the Marsh test as inapplicable to public schools.
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with precedent and with Utah's clear constitutional
provisions, without further review it could have stood as a
solid guide to Utah's public school officials.

Similarly,

the case could have served as important precedent in the
adjudication of any Utah prayer cases still pending under
federal law.
Another fancied dilemma which the Superintendent posits
for his conduct —

public school officials trapped between

individuals suing to compel prayers at schools and those
wishing to prevent them —

is totally unfounded.

In

Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) the
Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that
failure to allow organized prayer would either violate the
Instead they adopted the three-prong Establishment Clause
test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (affording
particular concern for prayer in the particular context of
public elementary and secondary schools). Those in favor of
certiorari review wanted the Supreme Court to rule on the
appropriateness of applying the Marsh test to public school
prayer issues. However, three weeks after the Stein
decision was handed down, the Supreme Court confirmed the
appropriateness of the Lemon test in school related
Establishment Clause cases. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578 (1987). The Court further specified that because the
Marsh test was founded upon a historical approach, it was
"not useful in determining the proper roles of church and
state in public schools, since free public education was
virtually non-existent at the time the Constitution was
adopted.11 Id. at 58 3 n.4. Thus, the Supreme Court had
already decided which test to apply to the public school
context. The Superintendent's willingness to ignore the
holding in Edwards indicates his pro-prayer stance.
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free exercise clause or would amount to the establishment of
religious secularism.

The right to free exercise of

religion does not mean that individuals can "use the
machinery of the state to practice [their] beliefs."
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).
Supreme Court has so aptly put:

As the United States

"The free exercise clause

simply cannot be understood to require the government to
conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with
the religious beliefs of a particular citizen."
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986).

See also,

Bowen v.

Lundberq v.

West Monona Community School District. 731 F.Supp 331 (N.D.
Iowa 1989) (finding that a high school graduation ceremony
was not a public forum).

The Superintendent could not

honestly claim to seek remedy for this fictitious dispute by
calling for guidance from the Supreme Court.

Alternatively,

Utah could easily avoid fighting about graduation prayer by
following a neutral stance with respect to religion, denying
prayer at public school functions.
Most importantly, Utah's constitutional establishment
clause (Art. I, § 4) is the final determinative factor as to
the propriety of prayer in Utah public schools.

See Sands

v. Morongo Unified School District, 809 P. 2d 809, 836 (Cal.
1991) (Mosk, J., concurring) (maintaining in the context of
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graduation prayer the "[s]tate courts are, and should be,
the first line of defense for individual liberties").
Although holdings of various federal courts present a
unified minimum legal basis to which Utah Courts can look,
the Utah Constitution requires protection more expansive
than that provided under federal law.

The United States

Supreme Court in deciding Weisman v. Lee would not and did
not consider the controlling provisions of Art. I, § 4 of
the Utah Constitution.

Thus, a decision in Weisman v. Lee

would be and was of little help in determining the
application of Article I, § 4 to high school graduation
prayers in Utah.
Thus, the alleged neutral goals which the
Superintendent claims to have sought to advance by financing
the Rhode Island appeal could have been achieved without the
expenditure of Utah public funds and without taking a stance
favoring religious exercises in Rhode Island.

However, the

Superintendent chose to unlawfully appropriate funds to
support religious exercise in public schools.
public funds to aid litigation —
sought to legalize school prayer.

He used

outside Utah —

Representing direct and

intentional support of religious exercise, this
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which

appropriation violated Article I, § 4 of the Utah
Constitution.

CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of the Superintendent's conduct
should be determined by this Court.

Taxpayers have standing

to challenge the Superintendent's conduct.

As a result of

the unlawful expenditure, plaintiffs have suffered a real
and direct injury which would be redressed by the
declaratory relief requested.

In addition, the Society has

an unsurpassed interest in the issues of this case which
would likely go unaddressed if plaintiffs were denied
standing.

Finally, the constitutional questions raised

herein are of great public importance and worthy of judicial
attention.
The Society's claim for declaratory judgment presents
an actual controversy, warranting the attention of the
judiciary.

Important constitutional issues and questions of

official misconduct, capable of repetition, remain to be
addressed.

Indeed, after judicial interpretation of this

matter, Utah public officials will be better able to tailor
their behavior to the mandates of the constitution.
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Finally, this Court should declare the Superintendents
unlawful expenditure to fund the legalization of prayer in
public schools unconstitutional under Article I, § 4.

Far

from incident and ancillary, the Superintendent's actions
represent direct financial support for religious exercise,
activity clearly prohibited by Utah's Constitution.

While

the Superintendent has some discretion to use public funds,
he cannot do so in a manner that violates the Utah
Constitution.
Wherefore, the decision of the trial court should be
reversed.

This Court should enter a judgment, granting the

Society the relief they requested, declaring the
Superintendent's appropriation unconstitutional under the
Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.
Dated this 15th day of JULY, 1992.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four (4)
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
to:
R. PAUL VAN DAM
JOHN S. MCALLISTER
Attorneys General
Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State
Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on the 15th day of JULY, 1992, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service•
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APPENDIX

UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JOHN PACE
USB #5624
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

CHRIS ALLEN; SOCIETY OF
SEPARATIONISTS, INC.,
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; and,
RICHARD ANDREWS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JAY B. TAGGART, Utah State
Superintendent of Public
Instruction,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

COMPLAINT
C i v i l No.

(Hon.

T

91-090-2848 CV

° Hanson

PLAINTIFFS, as a cause of action against the defendant
Jay Taggart, state and allege as follows:

1.

The Society of Separationists, Inc. is a Maryland

non-profit corporation registered to do business in Utah.
One of the corporate goals of the Society and the Utah
Chapter of the Society is to preserve and maintain the
separation of church and state as required by the United

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT^

States Constitution (First Amendment) and the Utah Constitution (Art. I, § 4 ) .
2.

The Utah Chapter of the Society of Separationists,

Inc. is made up of individual members who are residents and
taxpayers of the State of Utah.
3.

Richard Andrews is a resident and citizen of the

State of Utah.

He is a taxpayer and has for many years paid

various taxes (income, sales, etc.) to the State of Utah.
He is a member and the Co-Director of the Utah Chapter of
the Society of Separationists.
4.
of Utah.

Chris Allen is a resident and citizen of the State
He is a taxpayer and has for many years paid

various taxes (income, sales, etc.) to the State of Utah.
He is a member and the Director of the Utah Chapter of the
Society of Separationists.
5.

Jay B. Taggart, is the duly appointed and serving

State Superintendent of Public Instruction.

He supervises

and manages state tax funds and state monies and property on
behalf of the Utah State Office of Education and/or the Utah
State Board of Education.
6.

Art. I, § 4, of the Utah Constitution provides in

pertinent part:
. . . The State shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . There shall be no
union of Church and State, nor shall any church
dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be

appropriated for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or for the
support of any ecclesiastical establishment.
7.

On or about January 23, 1991, the Utah State Office

of Education by and through the defendant, Jay B. Taggart
gave to the Providence School Committee (and/or its privies
to the following described litigation) the sum of ten
thousand dollars ($10,000.00) from Utah state funds (public
money) for the purpose of aiding or encouraging the Providence School Committee (and/or its privies) to seek and
pursue a writ of certiorari before the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Robert E. Lee, et al v. Daniel Weisman,
etc., Case No. 90-1014.

(That case is hereinafter referred

to as the "Rhode Island School Prayer case.")

The issue in

that case is the constitutionality of a practice of having
denominational prayers at high school graduation ceremonies
in Providence, Rhode Island.
8.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari

in the Rhode Island School Prayer case describe above.
9.

The defendant and/or his agents have publically

stated that defendant's office and/or the State of Utah
and/or a state agency may file an amicus brief in the United
States Supreme Court in Rhode Island School Prayer case
addressing the merits of that case.
10.

The preparation and filing of such an amicus brief

on the merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case by the

defendant and his staff will result in the further use and
expenditure of public money and/or property by the defendant
and his staff.
11.

The preparation and filing of such an amicus brief

on the merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case by the
defendant and his staff on behalf of the State of Utah will
result in the further use and expenditure of public money or
property by the defendant and his staff in the aid of
religious worship, exercise or instruction, and/or for the
support of an ecclesiastical establishment.
12.

The plaintiffs object to the past expenditure of

public funds, as set forth above, for the purpose of aiding
any religious worship, exercise or instruction, and/or for
the support of an ecclesiastical establishment.
13.

Plaintiffs object to any future expenditure or

gift of public funds (similar to that set forth above) for
the purpose of aiding any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, and/or for the support of an ecclesiastical
establishment.
14.

Plaintiffs object to any future expenditure or

gift of public funds (similar to that set forth above) for
the purpose of aiding any party in the case of Robert E.
Lee, et al v. Daniel Weisman, etc, Case No. 90-1014, before
the United States Supreme Court.

15.

Plaintiffs object to any future expenditure of

public funds for the purpose of filing any briefs or in any
other way participating in the case of Robert E. Lee, et al
v. Daniel Weisman, etc., Case No. 90-1014, before the United
States Supreme Court.
16.

The plaintiffs believe that unless enjoined and

restrained by this Court, the defendant will expend public
funds as set forth above in violation of Art. I, § 4 of the
Utah Constitution.
17.

The plaintiffs believe that unless enjoined and

restrained by this Court, the defendant will violate Art. I,
§ 4 of the Utah Constitution by supporting a ecclesiastical
establishment through the filing of an amicus brief in the
Rhode Island School Prayer case.
18.

The anticipated actions of the defendant in

preparing and filing an amicus brief on the merits in the
Rhode Island School Prayer case will be in violation of the
provisions of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.
19.

Pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq (1953

as amended) the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory
judgment to the effect that the gift by the defendant of ten
thousand dollars ($10,000.00) to the Providence School
Committee as set forth above is in violation of the provisions of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.

WHEREFORE, this Court should enter a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction and a permanent
injunction against the defendant, his agents, staff and
employees prohibiting them from expending any public funds
or property in preparing and filing an amicus brief on the
merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case.
This Court should enter a temporary restraining order,
a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction against
the defendant, his agents, staff and employees prohibiting
them from preparing and filing an amicus brief on the merits
in the Rhode Island School Prayer case.
Pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq (1953 as
amended), a declaratory judgment should enter to the effect
that the gift by the defendant of ten thousand dollars
($10,000.00) to the Providence School Committee as set forth
above was in violation of the provisions of Art. I, § 4 of
the Utah Constitution.
Plaintiffs should be awarded their costs incurred
herein and such other and further relief as the Court deems
just and proper in the premises.
DATED LAW DAY this 1st day of MAY, 1991.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Before the

Court is the defendant's Motion to Dismiss brought to the

Court's attention by way
defendant's counsel.

of

a

Request

There

expired.

being

for responding

Dismiss is

bv the defendant.
appropriate

Order

submitted

by the

by the

defendant that the

well taken, it is granted for the reasons suggested

Counsel for
in

by the plaintiffs

nothing submitted by the plaintiffs, and it

appearing from reading the materials submitted
Motion to

Decision

The Court notes that the Motion to Dismiss was filed

with supporting Memoranda, and the time
has

for

the defendant

conformity

with

this

is requested

to prepare an

Minute Entry decision, and

submit the same to the Court for review and signature pursuant to the Code
of Judicial Administration.
Based upon this Court's order dismissing this action, the plaintiffs'
recently filed Motion for Consolidation is moot, and no further
the part

action on

of the defendant will be necessary in relation to that Motion in

this case.
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TIM0THY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Brian M. Barnard, Esq.
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R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312
Attorney General
JOHN S. MCALLISTER #2140
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Beneficial Life Tower
36 South Statef Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-3220
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC.
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; and,
RICHARD ANDREWS,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
-vJAY B. TAGGART, Utah State
Superintendent of Public
Instruction,

Civil No. 910902848CV
Judge:

Timothy R. Hanson

Defendant,
The court, having considered argument pursuant to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated June 19, 1991, under Rule
4-501 C.J.A., and being fully advised in the premises, and having
made its Minute Entry dated July 17, 1991, which entry is on file
herein,
NOW ORDERS, that this matter be and hereby is dismissed
with prejudice.
Dated this ( v; •^~day of-July, 1991.

TIMOTHY R. HANSEN
District Judge
PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

i

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

// day of July, 1991, a

copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal was mailed, postage
prepaid, to:
BRIAN M. BARNARD
JOHN PACE
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JOHN PACE
USB # 5624
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS,
INC. a Maryland non-profit
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN;
and, RICHARD ANDREWS,
Plaintiffs,

STATE OF UTAH

NOTICE OF APPEAL
j
j

vs.

::

JAY B. TAGGART, Utah State
Superintendent of Public
Instruction,

j

Civil No. 910902848 CV

:
(Hon. Timothy Hanson)

Defendant,

:

The plaintiffs, by and through counsel, hereby appeal
that certain Order and Dismissal signed in the above
captioned matter on August 6, 1991.

This appeal is to the

Utah Supreme Court.
DATED t h i s //\T&*y

o f AUGUST, 1 9 9 1 .

UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to:
JOHN S. MCALLISTER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
on the /^ff:day of AUGUST, 1991, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

